### 1nc

#### The 1AC’s gesture of recognition toward Cuba leaves UNTOUCHED the basic structures of oppression — removing Cuba from the terror list re-inscribes and legitimizes the coloniality of power.

Nelson Maldonado-Torres, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, ‘8 [*Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity*, p. 148-50] //DDI13

It is not possible to understand fully the difference between Fanon's and Honneth's critical takes on Hegel without considering their divergent views on the human subject and on the subjective motivations behind the struggle for recognition. Honneth correctly argues that when Hegel articulated the notion of a struggle for recognition he was definitely leaving behind a tradition of social and political thought that went back to Machiavelli and Hobbes, according to which self-preservation played the primary motivating role in leading humans to form states, political bodies, and institutions. According to Hegel, conflicts among humans were not to be traced back to a motive of self-preservation, but, as Honneth describes them, to moral impulses-that is, to the recognition of one's identity and personality. What Hegel, however, continues to hold, in line with dominant trends of political theory in his time, and what Honneth does not examine in his critical reflections on Hegel, is the extent to which the "right of property" functions as the primary marker of self-identity and personality. As a result, the struggle for recognition becomes primarily a struggle to be recognized as a proprietor. Hegel inherits this idea from a liberal tradition that defined human fraternity in terms of the coexistence in a "civil society" of autonomous individuals with rights of property--Locke's felicitous definition. Consider that for the Hegel of the Jena writings what initiated the struggle between persons was "theft," which made it clear that a violation of property was viewed as a violation of the person. Honor could only be regained in a life-and-death struggle. What changes in the Phenomenology of Spirit is that the life-and-death struggle, now subsumed in the dialectics of Spirit, gives rise to two modes of consciousness: one is independent and for-itself, while the other is dependent and takes the form of an object or thing; the former is lord, the latter is bondsman. Property becomes now a more complex category since even subjects can collapse into the category of objects, things, and possessions. The slave works on the property of the master and objectifies himself in it, while the master enjoys the product of the slave's work--from here comes the Marxist theory of alienation, which Marx later applied to economics and came up with the notion of surplus value. We have seen all of this already. What I want to add now is that there is a presumption that the relation between the subject and property is basic. Freedom is the objectification of the subjectivity of the individual. The end result of this is that the freedom and equality of the subject tend to collapse frequently into the claim for freedom and equality in the process of coming to possess something. We are free to possess what we want and equal in our chances to get what we want." This gives a dangerous self-referential character to the politics of recognition that threatens coalition politics and that more often than not leads only to minimal structural changes at the political and economic levels. The problem with the politics of recognition is therefore not so much that it dissolves questions of redistribution into questions of recognition as some have argued." The problem, in contrast, resides in self-centered claims for redistribution. In other words, the danger is w hen the struggle for recognition is reduced to questions about the respect, freedom, and equality of subjects who aim to overturn the system of lordship and bondage by coming finally to possess something of their own and to be recognized as proprietors. This conception of the struggle for recognition is fated to leave untouched the basic structure of the oppressive system that creates pathological modes of recognition and to hinder the chances for the formation of what has been aptly called "a coalition politics of receptive generosity.” In contrast to conceptions of the struggle for recognition articulated in terms of cultural identity or in terms of claims for possession and access to goods, Fanon discovered in his exploration of the lived experience of the black that one of the main challenges confronted by blacks in a racial society is not only that they are not recognized as people who can possess things, but that they are not recognized as people who can give things. Demands to be able to give are, in this respect, more radical than demands for possession. The master, under pressure, can allow the slave to have "things," but he will not recognize that he needs what the slave has. For the master, whatever the slave touches decreases in quality and value. Thus, even ifhe enters into commerce with the slave, the master will devalue the extent of the slave's contributions. Fanon was well aware of this dimension of the system of lordship and bondage. It was always the Negro teacher, the Negro doctor; brittle as I was becoming, I shivered at the slightest pretext. I knew, for instance, that if the physician made a mistake it would be the end of him and of all those who came after him. What could one expect, after all, from a Negro physician? As long as everything went well, he was praised to the skies, but look out, no nonsense, under any conditions! The black physician can never be sure how close he is to disgrace. I tell you, I was walled in: No exception was made for my refined manners, or my knowledge of literature, or my understanding of the quantum theory. (BSWM 1l7). Fanon suggests here that while coming to possess things or gaining abilities may be a necessary condition of the process of achieving liberation, it is certainly not sufficient and it should not become in itself the telos or goal of the process. The problem is that the logic of lordship and bondage may very well continue after formal concessions of rights of property. The master still resists opening himself to the Other and entering into the logic of ordinary ethical intersubjective contact. But why is it that the master resists accepting the gift or recognizing the Other as someone who can give? The answer should be clear by now: it makes evident the incompleteness of the master. Lordship requires impenetrability, while giving necessitates openness and receptivity. Giving in this sense represents the paradigmatic transgressive act. If giving is so dangerous it is not so much because it puts the other in debt, but because in the colonial context it requires an original act of openness that the master fundamentally resists." The master can easily pay any debt; what he cannot do is to open himself and to be receptive to the gift of the slave. This transaction violates the very meaning and purpose of the logic of lordship and bondage.

#### Coloniality generates a permanent state of exception that is the root cause of the death ethics of war and underwrites a hellish existence where death, murder, war, rape, and racism are ordinary

Maldonado-Torres 8 [Nelson, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity, p. 217-21]

Dussel, Quijano, and Wynter lead us to the understanding that what happened in the Americas was a transformation and naturalization of the non-ethics of war—which represented a sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian countries—into a more stable and long-standing reality of damnation, and that this epistemic and material shift occurred in the colony. Damnation, life in hell, is colonialism: a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery, now justified in relation to the very constitution of people and no longer solely or principally to their faith or belief. That human beings become slaves when they are vanquished in a war translates in the Americas into the suspicion that the conquered people, and then non-European peoples in general, are constitutively inferior and that therefore they should assume a position of slavery and serfdom. Later on, this idea would be solidified with respect to the slavery of African peoples, achieving stability up to the present with the tragic reality of different forms of racism. Through this process, what looked like a "state of exception" in the colonies became the rule in the modern world. However, deviating from Giorgio Agamben's diagnosis, one must say that the colony--long before the concentration camp and the Nazi politics of extermination--served as the testing ground for the limits and possibilities of modernity, thereby revealing its darkest secrets." It is race, the coloniality of power, and its concomitant Eurocentrism (and not only national socialisms or forms of fascism) that allow the "state of exception" to continue to define ordinary relations in this, our so-called postmodern world. ¶ Race emerges within a permanent state of exception where forms of behavior that are legitimate in war become a natural part of the ordinary way of life. In that world, an otherwise extraordinary affair becomes the norm and living in it requires extraordinary effort." In the racial/ colonial world, the "hell" of war becomes a condition that defines the reality of racialized selves, which Fanon referred to as the damnes de la terre (condemned of the earth). The damne (condemned) is a subject who exists in a permanent "hell," and as such, this figure serves as the main referent or liminal other that guarantees the continued affirmation of modernity as a paradigm of war. The hell of the condemned is not defined by the alienation of colonized productive forces, but rather signals the dispensability of racialized subjects, that is, the idea that the world would be fundamentally better without them. The racialized subject is ultimately a dispensable source of value, and exploitation is conceived in this context as due torture, and not solely as the extraction of surplus value. Moreover, it is this very same conception that gives rise to the particular erotic dynamics that characterize the relation between the master and its slaves or racialized workers. The condemned, in short, inhabit a context in which the confrontation with death and murder is ordinary. Their "hell" is not simply "other people," as Sartre would have put it-at least at one point - but rather racist perceptions that are responsible for the suspension of ethical behavior toward peoples at the bottom of the color line. Through racial conceptions that became central to the modern self, modernity and coloniality produced a permanent state of war that racialized and colonized subjects cannot evade or escape. ¶ The modern function of race and the coloniality of power, I am suggesting here, can be understood as a radicalization and naturalization of the non-ethics of war in colonialism." This non-ethics included the practices of eliminating and enslaving certain subjects-for example, indigenous and black-as part of the enterprise of colonization. From here one could as well refer to them as the death ethics of war. War, however, is not only about killing or enslaving; it also includes a particular treatment of sexuality and femininity: rape. Coloniality is an order of things that places people of color within the murderous and rapist view of a vigilant ego, and the primary targets of this rape are women. But men of color are also seen through these lenses and feminized, to become fundamentally penetrable subjects for the ego conquiro. Racialization functions through gender and sex, and the ego conquiro is thereby constitutively a phallic ego as well." Dussel. who presents this thesis of the phallic character of the ego cogito, also makes links, albeit indirectly, with the reality of war. ¶ And thus, in the beginning of modernity, before Descartes discovered ... a terrifying anthropological dualism in Europe, the Spanish conquistadors arrived in America. The phallic conception of the European-medieval world is now added to the forms of submission of the vanquished Indians. "Males," Bartolome de las Casas writes, are reduced through "the hardest, most horrible, and harshest serfdom"; but this only occurs with those who have remained alive, because many of them have died; however, "in war typically they only leave alive young men (mozos) and women.""5 The indigenous people who survive the massacre or are left alive have to contend with a world that considers them to be dispensable. And since their bodies have been conceived of as inherently inferior or violent, they must be constantly subdued or civilized, which requires renewed acts of conquest and colonization. The survivors continue to live in a world defined by war, and this situation is peculiar in the case of women. As T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renee T. White put it in the preface to their anthology Spoils of War: Women of Color, Cultures, and Revolutions: A sexist and/or racist patriarchal culture and order posts and attempts to maintain, through violent acts of force if necessary, the subjugation and inferiority of women of color. As Joy James notes, "its explicit, general premise constructs a conceptual framework of male [and/or white] as normative in order to enforce a politicaljracial, economic, cultural. sexual] and intellectual mandate of male [and/or white] as superior." The warfront has always been a "feminized" and "colored" space for women of color. Their experiences and perceptions of war, conflict, resistance, and struggle emerge from their specific racial-ethnic and gendered locations ... Inter arma silent leges: in time of war the law is silent," Walzer notes. Thus, this volume operates from the premise that war has been and is presently in our midst.” The links between war, conquest, and the exploitation of women's bodies are hardly accidental. In his study of war and gender, Joshua Goldstein argues that conquest usually proceeds through an extension of the rape and exploitation of women in wartime." He argues that to understand conquest, one needs to examine: I) male sexuality as a cause of aggression; 2) the feminization of enemies as symbolic domination; and 3) dependence on the exploitation of women's labor-including reproduction." My argument is, first, that these three elements came together in a powerful way in the idea of race that began to emerge in the conquest and colonization of the Americas. My second point is that through the idea of race, these elements exceed the activity of conquest and come to define what from that point on passes as the idea of a "normal" world. As a result, the phenomenology of a racial context resembles, if it is not fundamentally identical to, the phenomenology of war and conquest. Racism posits its targets as racialized and sexualized subjects that, once vanquished, are said to be inherently servile and whose bodies come to form part of an economy of sexual abuse, exploitation, and control. The coloniality of power cannot be fully understood without reference to the transformation and naturalization of war and conquest in modern times. ¶ Hellish existence in the colonial world carries with it both the racial and the gendered aspects of the naturalization of the non-ethics of war. "Killability" and "rapeability" are inscribed into the images of colonial bodies and deeply mark their ordinary existence. Lacking real authority, colonized men are permanently feminized and simultaneously represent a constant threat for whom any amount of authority, any visible trace of the phallus is multiplied in a symbolic hysteria that knows no lirnits.?" Mythical depiction of the black man's penis is a case in point: the black man is depicted as an aggressive sexual beast who desires to rape women, particularly white women. The black woman, in turn, is seen as always already sexually available to the rapist gaze of the white, and as fundamentally promiscuous. In short, the black woman is seen as a highly erotic being whose primary function is fulfilling sexual desire and reproduction. To be sure, any amount of "penis" in either one represents a threat, but in his most familiar and typical forms the black man represents the act of rape- "raping" -while the black woman is seen as the most legitimate victim of rape- "being raped." In an antiblack world black women appear as subjects who deserve to be raped and to suffer the consequences-in terms of a lack of protection from the legal system, sexual abuse, and lack of financial assistance to sustain themselves and their families-just as black men deserve to be penalized for raping, even without having committed the act. Both "raping" and "being raped" are attached to blackness as if they form part of the essence of black folk, who are seen as a dispensable population. Black bodies are seen as excessively violent and erotic, as well as being the legitimate recipients of excessive violence, erotic and otherwise." "Killability" and "rapeability" are part of their essence, understood in a phenomenological way. The "essence" of blackness in a colonial anti-black world is part of a larger context of meaning in which the death ethics of war gradually becomes a constitutive part of an allegedly normal world. In its modern racial and colonial connotations and uses, blackness is the invention and the projection of a social body oriented by the death ethics of war." This murderous and raping social body projects the features that define it onto sub-Others in order to be able to legitimate the same behavior that is allegedly descriptive of them. The same ideas that inspire perverted acts in war--particularly slavery, murder, and rape--are legitimized in modernity through the idea of race and gradually come to be seen as more or less normal thanks to the alleged obviousness and non-problematic character of black slavery and anti-black racism. To be sure, those who suffer the consequences of such a system are primarily blacks and indigenous peoples, but it also deeply affects all of those who appear as colored or close to darkness. In short, this system of symbolic representations, the material conditions that in part produce and continue to legitimate it, and the existential dynamics that occur therein (which are also at the same time derivative and constitutive of such a context) are part of a process that naturalizes the non-ethics or death ethics of war. Sub-ontological difference is the result of such naturalization and is legitimized through the idea of race. In such a world, ontology collapses into a Manicheanism, as Fanon suggested."

#### Vote negative to bring about “the end of the world” as we know it --- only by listening to the cry of the condemned and expressing a preferential option toward them through our critical intervention can we generate the nonsexist fraternity, affiliation, and ethic of love necessary to solve paradigms of war and spark a true humanity

Maldonado-Torres 8 [Nelson, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity, p. 243-46]

That Hitler is Europe's demon points to Dussel’s idea regarding the proto-history of the ego cogito. Before Descartes and Hitler, there was Cortes. Before Cartesianism and Hitlerism, there was racial slavery and colonialism. A de-colonial reduction of Western thought brings out these connections and reveals hidden dimensions in European modernity: from Cesaire's link between Hitlerism and colonialism to Dussel's phenomenology of the ego conquiro, to Fanon’s explorations of the lived experience of the colonized, in respect to which he tested the limits of dominant ontological and psychoanalytical conceptions. The European Cartesian-inspired sciences give way here to de-colonial Cesaireian inspired sciences and forms of critique according to which the truth and the good are only found, if not instantiated, by the preferential option for the damnes, the suspicion of master morality, the epistemic priority of the color line, and the ethical suspension of identity and the telos of empire. Cartesianism introduces a highly abstract conception of subjectivity that renders embodiment unimportant or problematic for the task of knowledge; Hitlerism, in contrast, emphasizes embodiment to the point where it becomes an essence. Levinas posed the alternative of erotic and reproductive embodied subjectivity in response to Hitlerism and liberalism. Fanon proposed the idea of the body as the "open door of every consciousness" (BSWM T23), that is, as a site of hospitality and generous interhuman contact, as his response to the anthropology of colonialism and racism. Recognition of the body does not lead in this account to racial politics but rather to de-colonial engagement defined as the creation of the world of the You, which, in a racist and colonial order, demands no less than "the end of the world" -- from here the relevance of politics and revolutionary action to Fanon. The embodied self for Fanon is primarily a site of generous interaction. Agency is defined primordially in ethical terms. Fraternity in this context no longer refers to blood relations but rather to the primacy of intersubjective contact. Once the embodied self is recognized as the point of departure, and the body is conceived as the "open door" of consciousness, then nonsexist human fraternity does not take a secondary role to liberty or equality. The demands of a consistent struggle for nonsexist human fraternity, perhaps better put as affiliation, points to the need for a suspension of the ultimate value of the affirmation of identity and to the need of altericity or the suspension of the universal through the preferential option for the damnes. Affiliation, which is defined by the Chicana theorist Chela Sandoval as "attraction, combination, and relation carved out of and in spite of difference," goes together here with non-indifference and responsibility, both of which presuppose listening to the cry of the condemned." To be sure, both listening and responsible action are only possible through embodiment. Action is in this sense no longer defined by the hand-that-takes but rather by receptive generosity and what Sandoval has aptly rendered as de-colonial love. In short, in new de-colonial sciences the search for truth and knowledge, the accomplishment of liberty and equality, and the satisfaction of demands for the recognition of identity respond to something greater than themselves: to the humanizing task of building a world in which genuine ethical relations become the norm and not the exception--the very subversion of the paradigm of war. The creation of the world of the You needs to be mediated by the exercise of critique. Philosophy is called to identify and denounce the moments in which structures of meaning respond to the interest of Being and betray the for-the-Other of signification. Philosophy performs a reduction of what has been "said" by showing the many ways in which the said turns against, rather than in favor of, the flourishing of ethics in the interhuman realm. Philosophy is called to show when certain formations of meaning create or are complicit with a context marked by the relation between a master and a slave. This relation is sometimes located at a basic intersubjective level, but its most frightful expression appears when it defines general modes of perception and behavior in communities, social bodies, and growing civilizations. At its highest level, the relation between master and slave takes on the control and division of the whole world and becomes empire. The critique of the imperial formation of the said evokes the de-colonial reduction. The de-colonial reduction attempts to bring out the pathologies of existence in contexts marked by the geopolitical extension of the relation between master and slave. By introducing coloniality as an axis of reflection in the examination of the lived worlds of communities, the de-colonial reduction makes clear how different sorts of pathologies can be traced back to the betrayal of the human in an imperial project of existence. The de-colonial reduction also opens up the mental space to enquire imaginatively into new possibilities of existence and the subversive power of loving or alterical acts. The critique of the imperial expression of the said or de-colonial reduction is ultimately performed by both the philosopher and the activist. The destabilization of the imperial order of things appears in thought as well as in praxis. At the end, Don Quixote, in his eccentric reflections, was a sort of philosopher himself. So was Frantz Fanon, who, with a rifle in one hand and a pen in the other, fought against dehumanizing and condescending ways of being and behaving. Expressions of anger and practices of violence represent the last recourse of the "damned." But activism has manifold ways to express itself, and to express itself continually it must, if it ever wants to see some change in the way that institutions work and in the manner in which we behave toward each other. The de-colonial reduction is, therefore, performed in praxis and not only in theory. It can become then both a way of thinking and a way of life. In both of these ways, the de-colonial reduction gives expression to a peculiar utopian ideal: the end of empire and of imperial man. It becomes a constant alert against the temptation of ever trying to form "a community of masters." This alert and the related utopian ideal pose a challenge to Western civilization. Vanquishing Eurocentrism in its many forms becomes one of the most urgent tasks of the de-colonial reduction. Unfortunately, neither philosophers of the right nor critics of the left yet perceive the importance of this task. On the one hand we find Eurocentric discussions of liberalism, communitarianism, or cosmopolitanism; on the other hand we find equally Eurocentric discussions of radical political action. We even find either open retrievals of Eurocentrism or Eurocentric critiques of Eurocentrism. These philosophers and critics have not realized that the first and most basic gesture of the critique of Eurocentrism lies in listening to what the peoples on the periphery have to say about truth, justice, love, critique, community life, and so forth. They have to hear the people on the periphery, learn from them, and fight with them for the attainment of a condition in which such people are able to reproduce their lives and contribute fully in discussions about the future of humanity. This does not mean that the learning process is unidirectional. This is rather a matter of enacting a receptive de-colonial attitude by virtue of which true communication can be achieved. The de-colonial attitude highlights the epistemic priority of the problem of the color line, which, following Lewis Gordon, could be understood as the line between the allegedly normative and abnormal identities and forms of life. The de-colonial attitude also gives a preferential option for the condemned of the earth, meaning that it takes centrally the questions, concerns, and proposals for de-colonization that emerge in the underside of the modern world. This does not mean that European responses must be rejected in toto since they have contributed and still contribute much to critical thinking; rather, they need to be opened up radically and transformed in light of the challenges posed by colonization and the paradigm of war. Resistance to such opening, dialogue, and transformation is a sad testimony to the persistence of Eurocentrism and the master morality of imperial man. De-colonization is waiting to occur not only in regard to material and cultural levels but also vis-a-vis epistemic levels.

#### The role of the ballot is to decolonize epistemology --- this turns and is mutually exclusive to the aff.

Mignolo 09 (Professor of Literature in Duke University, Joint Appointments in Cultural Anthropology and Romance Studies) Walter, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom,” Theory, Culture, & Society, 161-163, NDW //DDI13

ONCE UPON a time scholars assumed that the knowing subject in the disciplines is transparent, disincorporated from the known and untouched by the geo-political configuration of the world in which people are racially ranked and regions are racially configured. From a detached and neutral point of observation (that Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gómez (2007) describes as the hubris of the zero point), the knowing subject maps the world and its problems, classifies people and projects into what is good for them. Today that assumption is no longer tenable, although there are still many believers. At stake is indeed the question of racism and epistemology (Chukwudi Eze, 1997; Mignolo, forthcoming). And once upon a time scholars assumed that if you ‘come’ from Latin America you have to ‘talk about’ Latin America; that in such a case you have to be a token of your culture. Such expectation will not arise if the author ‘comes’ from Germany, France, England or the US. In such cases it is not assumed that you have to be talking about your culture but can function as a theoretically minded person. As we know: the first world has knowledge, the third world has culture; Native Americans have wisdom, Anglo Americans have science. The need for political and epistemic delinking here comes to the fore, as well as decolonializing and decolonial knowledges, necessary steps for imagining and building democratic, just, and non-imperial/colonial societies. Geo-politics of knowledge goes hand in hand with geo-politics of knowing. Who and when, why and where is knowledge generated (rather than produced, like cars or cell phones)? Asking these questions means to shift the attention from the enunciated to the enunciation. And by so doing, turning Descartes’s dictum inside out: rather than assuming that thinking comes before being, one assumes instead that it is a racially marked body in a geo-historical marked space that feels the urge or get the call to speak, to articulate, in whatever semiotic system, the urge that makes of living organisms ‘human’ beings. By setting the scenario in terms of geo- and body-politics I am starting and departing from already familiar notions of ‘situated knowledges’. Sure, all knowledges are situated and every knowledge is constructed. But that is just the beginning. The question is: who, when, why is constructing knowledges (Mignolo, 1999, 2005 [1995])? Why did eurocentered epistemology conceal its own geo-historical and bio-graphical locations and succeed in creating the idea of universal knowledge as if the knowing subjects were also universal? This illusion is pervasive today in the social sciences, the humanities, the natural sciences and the professional schools. Epistemic disobedience means to delink from the illusion of the zero point epistemology. The shift I am indicating is the anchor (constructed of course, located of course, not just anchored by nature or by God) of the argument that follows. It is the beginning of any epistemic decolonial de-linking with all its historical, political and ethical consequences. Why? Because geo-historical and bio-graphic loci of enunciation have been located by and through the making and transformation of the colonial matrix of power: a racial system of social classification that invented Occidentalism (e.g. Indias Occidentales), that created the conditions for Orientalism; distinguished the South of Europe from its center (Hegel) and, on that long history, remapped the world as first, second and third during the Cold War. Places of nonthought (of myth, non-western religions, folklore, underdevelopment involving regions and people) today have been waking up from the long process of westernization. The anthropos inhabiting non-European places discovered that s/he had been invented, as anthropos, by a locus of enunciations self-defined as humanitas. Now, there are currently two kinds or directions advanced by the former anthropos who are no longer claiming recognition by or inclusion in the humanitas, but engaging in epistemic disobedience and de-linking from the magic of the Western idea of modernity, ideals of humanity and promises of economic growth and financial prosperity (Wall Street dixit). One direction unfolds within the globalization of a type of economy that in both liberal and Marxist vocabulary is defined as ‘capitalism’. One of the strongest advocates of this is the Singaporean scholar, intellectual and politician Kishore Mahbubani, to which I will return later. One of his earlier book titles carries the unmistakable and irreverent message: Can Asians Think?: Understanding the Divide between East and West (2001). Following Mahbubani’s own terminology, this direction could be identified as de-westernization. Dewesternization means, within a capitalist economy, that the rules of the game and the shots are no longer called by Western players and institutions. The seventh Doha round is a signal example of de-westernizing options. The second direction is being advanced by what I describe as the decolonial option. The decolonial option is the singular connector of a diversity of decolonials. The decolonial paths have one thing in common: the colonial wound, the fact that regions and people around the world have been classified as underdeveloped economically and mentally. Racism not only affects people but also regions or, better yet, the conjunction of natural resources needed by humanitas in places inhabited by anthropos. De - colonial options have one aspect in common with de-westernizing arguments: the definitive rejection of ‘being told’ from the epistemic privileges of the zero point what ‘we’ are, what our ranking is in relation to the ideal of humanitas and what we have to do to be recognized as such. However, decolonial and de-westernizing options diverge in one crucial and in - disputable point: while the latter do not question the ‘civilization of death’ hidden under the rhetoric of modernization and prosperity, of the improvement of modern institutions (e.g. liberal democracy and an economy propelled by the principle of growth and prosperity), decolonial options start from the principle that the regeneration of life shall prevail over primacy of the production and reproduction of goods at the cost of life (life in general and of humanitas and anthropos alike!). I illustrate this direction, below, commenting on Partha Chatterjee’s re-orienting ‘eurocentered modernity’ toward the future in which ‘our modernity’ (in India, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in South America, briefly, in all regions of the world upon which eurocentered modernity was either imposed or ‘adopted’ by local actors assimilating to local histories inventing and enacting global designs) becomes the statement of interconnected dispersal in which decolonial futures are being played out. Last but not least, my argument doesn’t claim originality (‘originality’ is one of the basic expectations of modern control of subjectivity) but aims to make a contribution to growing processes of decoloniality around the world. My humble claim is that geo- and body-politics of knowledge has been hidden from the self-serving interests of Western epistemology and that a task of decolonial thinking is the unveiling of epistemic silences of Western epistemology and affirming the epistemic rights of the racially devalued, and decolonial options to allow the silences to build arguments to confront those who take ‘originality’ as the ultimate criterion for the final judgment.

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#### The affirmative’s concept of violence as external from their own lives allows individuals to abdicate their responsibility. Denial of our individual culpability with violence forecloses the possibility of meaningful change; in the process, violence becomes more likely.

Kappeler in 1995 [Susanne Kappeler, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg 1-4]

What is striking is that the **violence** which is talked about **is always** the violence **committed by someone else**: women talk about the violence of men, adults about the violence of young people; the left, liberals and the centre about the violence of right extremists; the right, centre and liberals about the violence of leftist extremists; political activists talk about structural violence, police and politicians about violence in the `street', and all together about the violence in our society. Similarly, Westerners talk about violence in the Balkans, Western citizens together with their generals about the violence of the Serbian army. Violence is recognized and measured by its visible effects, the spectacular blood of wounded bodies, the material destruction of objects, the visible damage left in the world of `objects'. In its measurable damage we see the proof that violence has taken place, the violence being reduced to this damage. The violation as such, or invisible forms of violence - the non-physical violence of threat and terror, of insult and humiliation, the violation of human dignity - are hardly ever the issue except to some extent in feminist and anti-racist analyses, or under the name of psychological violence. Here violence is recognized by the victims and defined from their perspective - an important step away from the catalogue of violent acts and the exclusive evidence of material traces in the object. Yet even here the focus tends to be on the effects and experience of violence, either the objective and scientific measure of psychological damage, or the increasingly subjective definition of violence as experience. Violence is perceived as a phenomenon for science to research and for politics to get a grip on. But violence is not a phenomenon: it is the behaviour of people, human action which may be analysed. What is missing is an analysis of violence as action - not just as acts of violence, or the cause of its effects, but as the actions of people in relation to other people and beings or things. Feminist critique, as well as other political critiques, has analysed the preconditions of violence, the unequal power relations which enable it to take place. However, under the pressure of mainstream science and a sociological perspective which increasingly dominates our thinking, it is becoming standard to argue as if it were these power relations which cause the violence. Underlying is a behaviourist model which prefers to see human action as the exclusive product of circumstances, **ignoring the personal decision of the agent to act**, implying in turn that circumstances virtually dictate certain forms of behaviour. Even though we would probably not underwrite these propositions in their crass form, there is nevertheless a growing tendency, not just in social science, to explain violent behaviour by its circumstances. (Compare the question, `Does pornography cause violence?') The circumstances identified may differ according to the politics of the explainers, but the method of explanation remains the same. While consideration of mitigating circumstances has its rightful place in a court of law trying (and defending) an offender, this does not automatically make it an adequate or sufficient practice for political analysis. It begs the question, in particular, `What is considered to be part of the circumstances (and by whom)?' Thus in the case of sexual offenders, there is a routine search - on the part of the tabloid press or professionals of violence - for experiences of violence in the offender's own past, an understanding which is rapidly solidifying in scientific model of a `cycle of violence'. That is, the relevant factors are sought in the distant past and in other contexts of action, e a crucial factor in the present context is ignored, namely the agent's decision to act as he did. Even politically oppositional groups are not immune to this mainstream sociologizing. Some left groups have tried to explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of Black men as the result of racist oppression. The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, **yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it.** Although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life context, these `explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence, that is, that these circumstances do not `cause' violent behaviour. They overlook, in other words, that the perpetrator has decided to violate, even if this decision was made in circumstances of limited choice. To overlook this decision, however, is itself a political decision, serving particular interests. In the first instance it serves to exonerate the perpetrators, whose responsibility is thus transferred to circumstances and a history for which other people (who remain beyond reach) are responsible. Moreover, it helps to stigmatize all those living in poverty and oppression; because they are obvious victims of violence and oppression, they are held to be potential perpetrators themselves.' This slanders all the women who have experienced sexual violence, yet do not use violence against others, and libels those experiencing racist and class oppression, yet do not necessarily act out violence. Far from supporting those oppressed by classist, racist or sexist oppression, it sells out these entire groups in the interest of exonerating individual members. It is a version of collective victim-blaming, of stigmatizing entire social strata as potential hotbeds of violence, which rests on and perpetuates the mainstream division of society into so-called marginal groups - the classic clienteles of social work and care politics (and of police repression) - and an implied `centre' to which all the speakers, explainers, researchers and careers themselves belong, and which we are to assume to be a zone of non-violence. Explaining people's violent behaviour by their circumstances also has the advantage of implying that the `solution' lies in a change to circumstances. Thus it has become fashionable among socially minded politicians and intellectuals in Germany to argue that the rising neo-Nazi violence of young people (men), especially in former East Germany, needs to be countered by combating poverty and unemployment in these areas. Likewise anti-racist groups like the Anti. Racist Alliance or the Anti-Nazi League in Britain argue that `the causes of racism, like poverty and unemployment, should be tackled and that it is `problems like unemployment and bad housing which lead to racism'.' Besides being no explanation at all of why (white poverty and unemployment should lead specifically to racist violence (and what would explain middle- and upper-class racism), it is more than questionable to combat poverty only (but precisely) when and where violence is exercised. It not only legitimates the violence (by `explaining' it), but constitutes an incentive to violence, confirming that social problems will be taken seriously when and where `they attract attention by means of violence - just as the most unruly children in schools (mostly boys) tend to get more attention from teachers than well-behaved and quiet children (mostly girls). Thus if German neo-Nazi youths and youth groups, since their murderous assaults on refugees and migrants in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Dresden etc., are treated to special youth projects and social care measures (to the tune of DM 20 million per year), including `educative' trips to Morocco and Israel,' this is am unmistakable signal to society that racist violence does indeed 'pay off'.

#### Political violence is sustained by organized thinking that looks at violence through meta-analysis. We need to have deeper insight that realizes that each of us is culpable for violence. This is integral to ending the cycle of violence and reclaiming agency.

Kappeler in 1995 [Susanne Kappeler, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg 8-11]

Moreover, personal behaviour is no alternative to `political' action; there is no question of either/or. My concern, on the contrary, is the connection between these recognized forms of violence and the forms of everyday behaviour which we consider `normal' but which betray our own will to violence - the connection, in other words, between our own actions and those acts of violence which are normally the focus of our political critiques. Precisely because there is no choice between dedicating oneself either to `political issues' or to `personal behaviour', the question of the politics of personal behaviour has (also) to be moved into the centre of our politics and our critique. Violence - what we usually recognize as such - is no exception to the rules, no deviation from the normal and nothing out of the ordinary, in a society in which exploitation and oppression are the norm, the ordinary and the rule. It is no misbehaviour of a minority amid good behaviour by the majority, nor the deeds of inhuman monsters amid humane humans, in a society in which there is no equality, in which people divide others according to race, class, sex and many other factors in order to rule, exploit, use, objectify, enslave, sell, torture and kill them, in which millions of animals are tortured, genetically manipulated, enslaved and slaughtered daily for `harmless' consumption by humans. It is no error of judgement, no moral lapse and no transgression against the customs of a culture which is thoroughly steeped in the values of profit and desire, of self-realization, expansion and progress. Violence as we usually perceive it is `simply' a specific - and to us still visible - form of violence, the consistent and logical application of the principles of our culture and everyday life. War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the `outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. **'We are the war'**, writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, `what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war ... And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen. ' `We are the war' - and we also `are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called `peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. `We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where **the major dramas of power** take place tends to **obscure our sight** in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and **our** own **responsibility** - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `**powerlessness'** and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens - even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into **underrating the responsibility** we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to **absolve us** from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that **we cannot `do' anything**, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution.' 7 , We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. So if we move beyond the usual frame of violence, towards the structures of thought employed in decisions to act, this also means making an analysis of action. This seems all the more urgent as action seems barely to be perceived any longer. There is talk of the government doing `nothing', of its `inaction', of the need for action, the time for action, the need for strategies, our inability to act as well as our desire to become `active' again. We seem to deem ourselves in a kind of action vacuum which, like the cosmic black hole, tends to consume any renewed effort only to increase its size. Hence this is also an attempt to shift the focus again to the fact that we are continually acting and doing, and that there is no such thing as not acting or doing nothing.

#### The alternative is to vote negative --- their analysis of violence is insufficient and you should punish their failure by politicizing the way we think about violence can we find ways to end the cycle of violence.

**Kappeler in 1995** [Susanne Kappeler, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior,* pg 4-5]

If we nevertheless continue to explain violence by its ‘circumstances’ and attempt to counter it by changing these circumstances, it is also because in this way we stay in command of the problem. In particular, we do not complicate the problem by any suggestions that it might be people who need to change. Instead, we turn the perpetrators of violence into the victims of circumstances, who as victims by definition, cannot act sensibly (but in changed circumstances will behave differently. ‘We,’ on the other hand, are the subjects able to take in hand the task of changing the circumstances. Even if changing the circumstance – combating poverty, unemployment, injustice, etc. – may not be easy, it nevertheless remains within ‘our’ scope at least theoretically and by means of state power. Changing people, on the other hand, is neither within our power nor, it seems, ultimately in our interest: we prefer to keep certain people under control, putting limits on their violent behavior, but we apparently have no interest in a politics that presupposes people's ability to change and aims at changing attitudes and behavior. For changing (as opposed to restricting) other people's behavior is beyond the range and in­fluence of our own power; only they themselves can change it. It requires their will to change, their will not to abuse power and not to use violence. A politics aiming at a change in people's behavior would require political work that is very much more cumbersome and very much less promising of success than is the use of state power and social control. It would require political consciousness-raising — politicizing the way we think — which cannot be imposed on others by force or compulsory educational measures. It would require a view of people which takes seriously and reckons with their will, both their will to violence and their will to change. To take seriously the will of others however would mean recognizing one's own, and putting people's will, including our own, at the centre of political reflection. A political analysis of violence needs to recognize this will, the personal decision in favour of violence - not just to describe acts of violence, or the conditions which enable them to take place, but also to capture the moment of decision which is the real impetus for violent action. For without this decision there will be no violent act, not even in circumstances which potentially permit it. It is the 3decision to violate, not just the act itself, which makes a person a perpetrator of violence - just as it is the decision not to do so which makes people not act violently and not abuse their power in a situation which would nevertheless permit it. This moment of decision, there­fore, is also the locus of potential resistance to violence. To understand the structures of thinking and the criteria, by which such decisions are reached, but above all to regard this decision as an act of choice, seems to me a necessary precondition for any political struggle against violence and for a non-violent society.

### 1nc

#### Interpretation --- economic engagement must be government-to-government.

**Daga, 13** - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic:

U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, <http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf>)

Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

#### ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005**

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### B. Violation – the plan merely removes barriers to private sector economic engagement

#### C. Voting issue –

**1. limits – a government limit is the only way to keep the topic manageable – otherwise they could use any 3rd party intermediary, lift barriers to private engagement, or target civil society – it makes topic preparation impossible**

**2. negative ground – formal governmental channels are key to predictable relations disads and counterplans that test ‘engagement’**

**3. effects T --- the plan in a vacuum doesn’t increase engagent**

## 2nc k

#### 2. Terrorist Exclusion --- the 1AC advocates refining the terror list to make it a more effective tool of isolation and exclusion. Their 1AC Jackson evidence says that the problem with the terror list is that it is both over- and under-inclusive --- implying that the terror list would be fine so long as it were accurate. The plan is a tool to IMPROVE our ability to dominate the “real” terrorists. The 1AC maintains the category of “Terrorism” in order to effectively fight those marked by colonialism. This is classic coloniality – gestures of inclusion are used to double down on exclusionary violence.

Mignolo 2000 [Walter, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University Local Histories/Global Designs, 175-178] //DDI13

In 1971 Dussel, starting and departing from Levinas, conceived totality as composed by "the same" and "the other." Describing the totality formed by "the same" and "the other," Dussel called it "the Same." And we'll see soon why. Outside totality was the domain of "the other." The difference in Spanish was rendered between *lo otro,* which is the complementary class of ihe same" and *el otro* relegated to the domain exterior to the system. I am tempted to translate this view today as a "interior" and "exterior" subalternilics. Socially and ontologically, the exteriority is the domain of the homeless, unemployed, illegal aliens cast out from education, from the economy, and the laws that regulate the system. Metaphysically, "the other" is—from the perspective of the totality and the "same"—the unthinkable that Dussel urges us to think. "Philosophy in Latin America, and this is a first conclusion, should begin by making a critique of Totality as totality" (1975, 21). this conception is useful in the sense that the difference between interior and exterior subalternities is framed in legal and economic terms. Thus, it is indeed a class difference. However, the difference is not justified in terms of class but in terms of ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and sometimes ity (i.e., if the nationality in question happens to be "against" democracy and Western nationalistic ideals). Nobody is cast out because he or she is poor. He or she becomes poor because he or she has been cast out. On the other hand, this difference allows us to understand that gender, ethnic and sexual differences could be absorbed by the system and placed in the sphere of interior subalternity. This is visible today in the United States as far asAfro-Americans, women, Hispanics, and queers (although with sensible differences between these groups) are becoming accepted within the system as *lo otro,* complementary of the totality controlled by "the same." Beyond the fact lhat Dussel used some questionable metaphors based on the structure of the Christian family to make his argument, he also untie 1 lined very important historical dimensions: 1. A critique of modern epistemology or modern thinking *(el pensiii moderno);* 2. The coloniality of power introduced by Christianity in the "dis covery" of America and in what Dussel ( 1 9 9 6 ; 1998a) most recent I\ identified as the modern world system. Dussel placed what is known today as Latin America in the exteriority of "the other" upon which tin modern world system constituted itself; 3. Claims that looking at Latin America as "the olher" explain the successive constructions of exteriorities in the colonial histories of the modern world system and, consequently, the similarity (beyond obvl ous differences in their local histories) among regions of the "Third World" (e.g., the Arabic world, black Africa, India, Southeast Asia, and China); 4. Consequently, and beyond the details of the geopolitical relations and the fact that these observations were made during the crucial year, of the cold war, the geopolitical conclusions were that Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union constitute "the geopolitical same" while the rest constitute "the geopolitical other." At this point the lot .1 tion of Latin America as "the other" is ambiguous. Dussel's argument tries to show the uniqueness of Latin America as the only geopolitic al and subaltern unit—with the exception of Cuba—that cannot entertain a dialogue with Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union at the same time, while all the other geopolitical units can, but this line ol argumentation is unconvincing. However, I would like to retain from this issue Dussel's confrontation with Marxism in the modern world system as well as in Latin America. His conceptualization of Totality in historical and socioeconomic and legit terms led Dussel, a serious scholar of Marx (Dussel 1985; 1988; 1990) n I a critic of Marx and of Marxism in Latin America. Marx's unquestionable contribution to the analysis of the functioning of capitalist economy cannot not be confused with Marx's sightless when it came to the location ni The other" *(el otro*) and the exteriority of the system. That is, Marx, •n • Hiding to Dussel, only thinks in terms of totality ("the same" and "the i a In i," which is the working class) but is less aware of alterity, the exteriority ni ihe system. Hence, Marx's thinking on these issues is located within modern epistemology and ontology. In his critical analysis about modern episteItmlogy *(el pensar moderno),* that term to which he attributed the conceptual .iiion of totality I described earlier, Dussel summarizes ideas well known (nilny, although less familiar in 1971. Modern thought since Descartes, Dus• I argues, presupposed an ontology of totality that, for reasons that are quite linple, had to include a metaphysic of alterity as negativity. The reason, he Hrues, can be found in the ontological break of modern thought with its i iieck legacies. The modern concept of being is secular and is therefore built upon a negation of the other, which is identified with the God of Christian totality. The same, now, is the ego, an ego without God. Totality, according In Dussel, is no longer a *fysis* (in the sense of ancient Greek philosophy) hill *ego;* there is no longer a physic but an *egotic* totality. To this egotic Inundation of totality corresponds the Kantian left *denke* and Marx's *Ich arliflle.* Hegel, for whom Knowledge and Totality are the Absolute, installed lilmsclf, according to Dussel, at the crux of modern thought. Neither Nietzsche nor Marx could escape from the modern paradigm. Nietzsche's mystical experience, in the Alps, where he discovered that "All is one," napped him in the idea of an eternal return to "the Same," a Totality moved li\ "a will to power," to which Dussel opposes the "dominated will." He • i includes by saying that: A esta modernidad pertenece tanto el capitalismo liberal, y por lo tanto tambien el dependiente latinoamericano, como tambien el marxismo ortodoxo. Esto me parece fundamental en este momento presente de America Latina. Puedo decir t|iie no son *radicalmente* opuestos siquiera, sino que son ontologicamente "lo Mismo." Esto, evidentemente, no lo aceptarian con ninguna facilidad muchos marxistas del tipo althuseriano, por ejemplo. (Dussel 1975, 21) in this modernity belongs both liberal capitalism, and consequently Latin American dependent capitalism, as well as orthodox Marxism. This premise is basic for me, at this particular junction of Latin American history. 1 can say that liberal capitalism and Marxism are not *radically* opposed but that they are indeed ontologically "the Same." This conclusion may not be easily accepted, I believe, by Althusserian-Marxists. Dusscl's view of the inadequacy of Marxism for Latin America is grounded in Ins analysis of modern thought and the place of Marxism in this paradigm— mainly, in the fact that modern thought was oblivious of colonialiiy. I mil America" in this case could be read as the unthinkable of modernity, ni , iJ only thinkable within modernity, but not as coloniality. In his own won I El marxismo es incompatible ontologicamente no solo con la tradicion Lalliin americana sino con la meta-fisica de la Alteridad. No es puramente una inn i pretacion econoniico socio-politica, es tambien una ontologfa, y, como tal, n intrinsicamente incompatible con una metafisica de la Alteridad. No es incom patible, en cambio, lo que podria llamarse *socialismo;* esto ya es otra cuestion (Dussel 1975, 41) Marxism is ontologically incompatible not only with the Latin American tradt tion but also with the metaphysic of alterity. Marxism is not only an economic and sociopolitic interpretation but, as such, is intrinsically incompatible with the metaphysic of Alterity. It is not incompatible, on the contrary, with something that could be called *socialism.* This is a different story. Here, Dussel puts his finger on an issue and a possible debate within the I. It itself. First of all, Dussel's view of Marxism as ingrained in "modern thinking" (el *pensar moderno*) and not alien to it, has been restated by others molt recently (Immanuel Wallerstein recently did so in his discussions ol tin geoculture of the modern world system [1991a, 8 4 - 9 7 ] ) . But that is not all and perhaps not the most interesting aspect of Dussel's position. Of more interest for the argument of this chapter is the fact that il coincides wilh tin positions defended by Aymara intellectual and activist Fausto Reinaga. What are the grounds from which Dussel is defending this argument? My sense is that it has to do with his view of the deopolitics of Christianity. Let me explain.

#### 3) Methodology --- The 1AC tethers emancipatory philosophical movements to pragmatism and policy relevance --- this aspiration for universal truth and commonality puts the cart before the horse, foreclosing the possibility for decolonial contestation of actually existing Western hierarchies --- this is a specific link to their Stehn evidence.

Margutti 13 [Paulo, professor in the Department of Philosophy at Jesuit School of Philosophy and Theology in Belo Horizonte, “Pragmatism and Decolonial Thinking: an Analysis of Dewey’s Ethnocentrism”, http://www.pucsp.br/pragmatismo/dowloads/lectures\_papers/margutti-14thimppaper.pdf, p. 18-21]

The above discussion does not exhaust the answer to our second question. We still have to consider the problem of silence in the rhetoric of modernity. Sullivan argues that, by neglecting a full-fledged confront with the question on race, Dewey is not just leaving a blank space in his writings. In fact, he is creating an omission which has powerful effects. One of them is to perpetuate what Charles Mills calls the theoretical and conceptual whiteness of philosophy. By silencing the question on race and racism, Dewey fails to recognize that only white people have been counted as complete persons, ethical agents, creators of knowledge and legitimate citizens. This turns philosophy into an investigation which is relevant only to Whites, and, what is worse, disencourages Negroes, Latinos, Asians and Natives to study philosophy.50 The neglect on race in a racist world does not correspond to a neutral position, because its effects are not neutral. It perpetuates white solipsism, which views non-White existence and experience as insignificant.51 Sullivan’s criticism of Dewey’s silence is in tune with Margonis’, who accuses Dewey of helping to create the terms of a new social amnesia, featuring a philosophy which looks to the possibilities of the future and avoids the colonial past and present racist violence. The problem is that Dewey’s description of a future democracy does not fit with an unpalatable colonial past which reasserts itself unchecked in the most irregular and inconsistent ways.52 ¶ As we can see, Dewey seems to have adhered to the rhetoric of modernity. His terminology used to refer to primitive men, his assumption that modern Western society is superior to non-Western cultures, his ambiguous position towards racial friction, his unjustifiable silence on racial issues, all these factors strongly suggest that Dewey was unconsciously caught by the predominant racist views of his time and practiced the rhetoric of modernity in order to justify it. True, in a way analogous to Kant’s case, some scholars attempt to mitigate Dewey’s ethnocentrism. Fallace, for example, affirms that until the First World War, Dewey held the ethnocentric view mentioned above. Although he did not see the inferiority of non-White cultures as the result of biological inheritance, he failed to appreciate their intrinsic value, considering their worth to be only as an object of study for a better understanding of the evolution of modern mind. For this reason, ethnocentrism contaminated the pedagogy of his early and middle years. In order to get rid of such ethnocentrism, Dewey would have to abandon linear historicism and genetic psychology. And he did that after the First World War, by adopting a pluralistic appreciation of cultures as equally valid, albeit different, ways of looking at the world.53 But this is a controversial issue. Goudenow, for instance, argues that, in the Depression years, despite Dewey’s and other progressive intellectuals’ promise to create schools which would reflect and change the “real” world, they seldom urged that schools deal with the experiences of the minorities or with the structures and institutions which reinforced unequality and racism. There is little evidence to suggest that Dewey and the progressive intellectuals saw local ethnic communities as capable of consciously shaping the future of American society. They seem to have merely adopted the safest possible route to cool the racial struggles of their time, namely, schooling and other forms of education which would stimulate tolerance.54 And Fallace himself recognizes that the cultural pluralism found in Dewey’s later works did not negate the ethnocentrism of his writings prior to 1916.55 ¶ The overall result of the above discussion may be summarized as follows. The application of Mignolo’s and Osamu’s decolonial ideas to the analysis of some great Western thinkers such as Kant and Dewey reveals that they are influenced by the colonial matrix of power and adhere to the rhetoric of modernity. In Dewey’s specific case, we may conclude that, although he adopts a more moderate stance on the subject, he still adopts an ethnocentric stance which finds some of its roots in Kant’s thinking. As a matter of fact, Dewey and Kant have the following points in common in their ethnocentric biases. First, both see modern Western culture as the goal towards which all other cultures should direct their respective historical evolutions. Second, both see humanity as divided in at least two segments, the one represented by Western humanitas and the other represented by non-Western anthropos. Third, both present their ideas under the disguise of universality, although such ideas are contaminated by the particularism of Western modern imperial view of the world. Fourth, both make implicit, by means of a convenient silence, the connexions between their “universal” theories and their particular and biased views about Man and Mankind, thus creating a blank logical space to be filled also in silence by their fellow members of humanitas’s privileged club. What is more, the convenient silence allows the rhetorical separation of the “universal” theories and their corresponding particular and biased views, when it becomes necessary to “save” any of these Authors’s ideas from the accusation of racism. ¶ We affirmed in the beginning of the present text that it is intended as a reminder to a question which haunts Modern philosophy, and which remains unsolved so far. Now we expect the reminder not only has done its job, but also may function as a warning against the type of thinking practiced by some Western philosophers, who, despite their honest and good intentions, hide behind an alleged universality the particularities of their modern/colonial views. And this may happen even when an authentic liberal and democratic thinker like Dewey is involved, casting doubts on the pragmatism’s ability to explain human life as it really is. Maybe we are in need of a renewed and decolonial way of thinking the philosophical universal.

#### We do not provide a roadmap as objective but rather opens up a space for different epistemologies to arise --- its not about saying one way of knowing is best but rather that some crowd out other ways of knowing and delinking is a prerequisite to finding a good epistemology ---

Walter Mignolo, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature at Duke University, ’11 [The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options, p. xxvii-xxviii] //DDI13

Decoloniality means decolonial options confronting and delinking from coloniality, or the colonial matrix of power. While the decolonial option is not proposed as the option, it is an option claiming its legitimacy among existing ones in the sphere of the political, in the same way that Christianity, Marxism, or liberalism house many options under the same umbrella (I will come back to this point in more detail in chapter 1). And it is an option claiming its legitimacy among existing academic projects, such as postcoloniality, ethnic studies, gender studies, the social sciences and the humanities, and the professional schools; but also it is an option among options offered by macro-narratives such as Christianity, liberalism, and Marxism. '!he decolonial option also doesn't mean "decolonialmission(s)." Missions implied projects of conversion of achieving and end programmed in the blueprint. Options are the antithesis of missions. We--decolonial intellectuals--are not missionaries going to the field to convert and promote our form of salvation. What we-and by "we" I refer here to all those who share decolonial projects-put on the table is an option to be embraced by all those who find in the option(s) a response to his or her concern and who will actively engage, politically and epistcmically, to advance proj- ects of epistemic and subjective decolonization and in building communal futures. That is why my argument is built on "options" and not on "alternatives." If you look for alternatives you accept a point of reference instead of a set of existing options among which the decolonial enters claiming its legitimacy to sit at the table when global futures are being discussed. For that reason, the first dccolonial step is delinking from coloniality and not looking for alternative modernities but for alternatives to modernity. Not only arc postcoloniality and decoloniality two different options within the same set (like it happens within Christianity, Marxism, lslamism, Buddhism, and the like, where the names encompass unity in diversity), having modern/ colonial histories and experiences in common, but both are options offered in diverse universes of discourse and sensing. Postcoloniality, f()r example, emerged as an option to poststructuralism and postmodernity, but decolo- niality emerged as an option to the rhetoric of modernity and to the com- bined rhetoric of "development and modernization" (from 1950 to 1970), re-converted to "globalism" during the Reagan years. Decoloniality came to light also as an option to the discourse of decolonization during the Cold War and as a critical option in relation to Marxist-dialectical materialism.

#### 9. We don’t presuppose a universal truth but rather open up spaces for new types of thought that have been occluded by coloniality.

Mignolo (Professor of Literature in Duke University, Joint Appointments in Cultural Anthropology and Romance Studies) 2012

Walter, “Epistemic Disobedience and the Decolonial Option: A Manifesto,” Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 45-46, NDW //DDI13

But the basic formulation of decolonial delinking (e.g., desprendimiento) was advanced by Aníbal Quijano in his ground-breaking article “Colonialidad y modernidad/racionalidad” (1991) [Coloniality and modernity/rationality]. The argument was that, on the one hand, an analytic of the limits of Eurocentrism (as a hegemonic structure of knowledge and beliefs) is needed. But that analytic was considered necessary rather than sufficient. It was necessary, Quijano asserted, “desprenderse de las vinculaciones de la racionalidad-modernidad con la colonialidad, en primer término, y en definitiva con todo poder no constituido en la decisión libre de gentes libres” [“It is necessary to extricate oneself from the linkages between rationality/modernity and coloniality, first of all, and definitely from all power which is not constituted by free decisions made by free people”].4 “Desprenderse” means epistemic de-linking or, in other words, epistemic disobedience. Epistemic disobedience leads us to decolonial options as a set of projects that have in common the effects experienced by all the inhabitants of the globe that were at the receiving end of global designs to colonize the economy (appropriation of land and natural resources), authority (management by the Monarch, the State, or the Church), and police and military enforcement (coloniality of power), to colonize knowledges (languages, categories of thoughts, belief systems, etc.) and beings (subjectivity). “Delinking” is then necessary because there is no way out of the coloniality of power from within Western (Greek and Latin) categories of thought. Consequently, de-linking implies epistemic disobedience rather than the constant search for “newness” (e.g., as if Michel Foucault’s concept of racism and power were “better” or more “appropriate” because they are “newer”—that is, post-modern—within the chronological history or archaeology of European ideas). Epistemic disobedience takes us to a different place, to a different “beginning” (not in Greece, but in the responses to the “conquest and colonization” of America and the massive trade of enslaved Africans), to spatial sites of struggles and building rather than to a new temporality within the same space (from Greece, to Rome, to Paris, to London, to Washington DC). I will explore the opening up of these spaces—the spatial paradigmatic breaks of epistemic disobedience—in Waman Puma de Ayala and Ottabah Cugoano. The basic argument (almost a syllogism) that I will develop here is the following: if coloniality is constitutive of modernity since the salvationist rhetoric of modernity presupposes the oppressive and condemnatory logic of coloniality (from there come the damnés of Fanon), then this oppressive logic produces an energy of discontent, of distrust, of release within those who react against imperial violence. This energy is translated into decolonial projects that, as a last resort, are also constitutive of modernity. Modernity is a three-headed hydra, even though it only reveals one head: the rhetoric of salvation and progress. Coloniality, one of whose facets is poverty and the propagation of AIDS in Africa, does not appear in the rhetoric of modernity as its necessary counterpart, but rather as something that emanates from it. For example, the Millennium Plan of the United Nations headed by Kofi Anan, and the Earth Institute at Columbia University headed by Jeffrey Sachs, work in collaboration to end poverty (as the title of Sach’s book announces).5 But, while they question the unfortunate consequences of modernity, never for a moment is the ideology of modernity or the black pits that hide its rhetoric ever questioned: the consequences of the very nature of the capitalist economy—by which such ideology is supported—in its various facets since the mercantilism of the sixteenth century, free trade of the following centuries, the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century, and the technological revolution of the twentieth century. On the other hand, despite all the debate in the media about the war against terrorism, on one side, and all types of uprisings, of protests and social movements, it is never suggested that the logic of coloniality that hides beneath the rhetoric of modernity necessarily generates the irreducible energy of humiliated, vilified, forgotten, or marginalized human beings. Decoloniality is therefore the energy that does not allow the operation of the logic of coloniality nor believes the fairy tales of the rhetoric of modernity. Therefore, decoloniality has a varied range of manifestations—some undesirable, such as those that Washington today describes as “terrorists”—and decolonial thinking is, then, thinking that de-links and opens (de-linking and opening in the title come from here) to the possibilities hidden (colonized and discredited, such as the traditional, barbarian, primitive, mystic, etc.) by the modern rationality that is mounted and enclosed by categories of Greek, Latin, and the six modern imperial European languages.

#### DA to your methodology --- transforming institutions fails.

Grosfoguel 11, Ramón. "Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality." TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1, no. 1 (2011): 21-22 //DDI13

In the present world-system, a peripheral nation-state may experience transformations in its form of incorporation to the capitalist world-economy, a minority of which might even move to a semi-peripheral position. However, to break with, or transform, the whole system from a nation-state level is completely beyond their range of possibilities (Wallerstein, 1992a; 1992b). Therefore, a global problem cannot have a national solution. This is not to deny the importance of political interventions at the nation-state level. The point here is not to reify the nation-state and to understand the limits of political interventions at this level for the long-term transformation of a system that operates at a world-scale. The nation-state, although still an important institution of Historical Capitalism, is a limited but important space for radical political and social transformations. Collective agencies in the periphery need a global scope in order to make an effective political intervention in the capitalist world-system. Social struggles below and above the nation-state are strategic spaces of political intervention that are frequently ignored when the focus of the movements privileges the nation-state. Social movements’ local and global connections are crucial for effective political interventions. The dependentistas overlooked this due, in part, to their tendency to privilege the nation-state as the unit of analysis and to the economic reductionist emphasis of their approaches. This had terrible political consequences for the Latin American left and the credibility of the dependentista political project.

#### Your feel-good epistemology is a placebo.

Maldonado-Torres ‘2 (Nelson, Associate Professor of Comparative Literature at Rutgers; “Postimperial Reflections on Crisis, Knowledge, and Utopia,” *Review* XXV, 3, p227-315) //DDI13

\*gender modified

It must be clear now that my critique of Mignolo does not merge from a particular interest in defending the European from n unjustifiable dismissal of his epistemic capacities, as my critique f the "epistemic segregation" implied in the notion of colonial difference would appear. If the notion of colonial difference is suspect to me it is not so much because it leaves the European aside, but because it still carries the idea of there being a European in the first place. This idea reduces the effectiveness of a transgresstopic critique, which requires a questioning of any such isolated point of view and demands nothing less than a radical transformation in the European's way to see ~~himself~~ [themselves] and the world. The costs of the post­occidental radical turn announced and partly enacted by the notion of "colonial difference" may be simply too high, since its articulation entails the survival and legitimization of a now local but still ethnocentric epistemological conception (the European). I suggest, in line with the concept of transgresstopic critical hermeneutics announced here, that the focus of attention be expanded from the space of the colonized and the effects of the coloniality of power in that space, to the colonial and imperial forces that sustain a regime of power in which both colonized and colonizer come into being. This partly includes a more decisive emphasis on the "colonial" side of the equation represented by the notion of "colonial difference." It is true that the forms of knowledge that appear in colonized context are as much a result as a response to the colonial and imperial powers that I refer to here. Yet it is still necessary to make explicit the critical implications of the uncovering of coloniality as a constitutive force in the formation of subjects and life-worlds. These are, among others, (1) that the European is as much a product of coloni­ality as the colonized-to which one may add that the European monological attitude hides a more profound "internal" pluritopicality (see Estermann, 1998: 22), (2) that the European must aspire to articulate a postimperial point of view, and (3) that the articulation of such a point of view implies a radical questioning of the mode of living and knowing implicated in the very idea of an "European." In short, the European cannot simply continue existing as we have known ~~him~~ [them].18 The relativization of his point of view is only the negative side of a most difficult task at "unlearning imperial privileged" and at fomenting postimperial forms of life. Perhaps the first step in this direction consists in hearing what the colonized subaltern has to say about colonization and about the privileged imperial subject, the European. Unlearning imperial privilege, however, **cannot simply consist in adopting a generous epistemological attitude toward the subaltern**. This unlearning is to be the place where ethics and knowledge meet since the promotion of a postimperial form of life and the possibility of generating an authentic "dialogue" with the subaltern cannot dispense with a praxis that aims to bring about the collapse of the segregating walls created by imperial violence. All those sublime thoughts that most of us share, those institutions so sacred to the West, and those nationalist projects that take their force from the backs of segregated populations concen­ trated in ghettos or living in reservations need to be revaluated as part of this unlearning. Nothing less than a moratorium on the West is required for this unlearning to take place. Unexpected narratives may then begin to emerge in different locations-as they have merged from peripheral subjectivities. Insofar as these narratives and subsequent macronarratives are informed by interactions with subjects from different places they will not respond uniquely to the horizons provided by spatial location. Transgresstopical in character, breaking the horizon of the local and overcoming the logic of the imperial reproduction (or rather, elimination) of the species, these macronarratives announce a postcolonial future and the possibility of forging a postoccidental world. This is to be achieved both by ceasing to take the West as the global, and by attempting to articu­ late and promote the idea of a postimperial West. This is the chal­ lenge of will and imagination for the West at the beginnings of the twenty-first century. The only "burden" of European Man and his American successor is to deal with themselves.